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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Respondents generally agree with Appellant's statements 
regarding the jurisdiction of this Court and the nature of the 
proceedings below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In late 1981, Appellant responded to Respondents' 
newspaper advertisement for the sale of the Subject cinder block 
plant and related equipment. (T 17) 
From the beginning of their dealings, Appellant 
understood that Respondents had never operated the plant; could 
not and would not warrant its condition. (T £>1, 153-154, 158) In 
fact, Appellant knew that Respondents had sefen the plant produce 
block on only one occasion. The former ownetrs had requested 
permission to make one more "run" after turning possession of the 
plant to Respondents. (T 21) 
According to Appellant's own accountr Respondent Larkin 
"directed" him to talk to the former owners and find out what the 
machinery was capable of doing. (T 153-154) Respondent Larkin 
also encouraged Appellant to talk to Gerald Strong who had 
completely rebuilt the block plant. (T 155) 
Appellant also initiated contact vfith Praschak Block 
Company, the original manufacturer of the pliant. (T 154) 
Following this contact, Appellant inspected -he machinery and 
found nothing which discouraged him from puisuina contract 
negotiations with Respondents. (T 155) 
Respondents did nothing which in iny way impaired 
1 
Appellant's access to or inspection of the machinery. (T 153) 
In the course of negotiations Respondent Larkin 
attempted to project the income-producing capability of the plant 
by using various levels of production and assuming various 
factors including the wholesale price of block, the cost of 
cement, cinders, labor, repairs and maintenance, etc. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibits Nos. 3, 4, and 14) 
On or about March 25, 1982, Appellant approached 
Respondent Larkin and asked him to prepare another projection 
based upon an abbreviated year (9 months). (T 45-46; Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 14) By Appellant's own account, this revision was 
sought because: "I'd been there long enough to know it [the block 
plant] wouldn't operate the way he [Larkin] said it would do." (T 
166) By March, Appellant was thoroughly acquainted with the 
block plant and related equipment. (T 35, 36, 166-167) 
By May, 1982, Appellant had become discouraged as a 
result of problems he was experiencing with the plant and decided 
not to pursue the consummation of any contract with Respondent 
Lava Products. (T 150) In Appellant's own words: ". . .it 
became obvious to me about then that there was no way, with my 
limited funds, that I could ever get that block machine to 
operate." (T 52) 
Appellant then testified that in September, 1982, 
Respondent Larkin contacted Appellant and offered to help 
Appellant get the block plant into operation. (T 52-53, 157) The 
record clearly indicates that Respondents spent a great amount of 
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time and money in the fulfillment of that copimitment. (T 54, 57-
59, 63-68) 
Between October, 1981, and Decembei:, 1982, Appellant 
spent at least 73 days at the block plant. (T 152) Finally the 
parties reached an agreement regarding the l^ase and purchase of 
the plant. This agreement was reduced to writing and signed on 
December 21, 1982. (Plaintiffs Exhibit No. L8) 
Appellant's own ledgers indicate that following the 
execution of the agreement, he never made the necessary 
investment of operating capital, spending but a small fraction of 
the monies which had been projected for repairs, maintenance, and 
labor. (T 169-170, 172-175; Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 31) 
Frustrated and discouraged by continuing difficulties, 
Appellant ultimately abandoned the undertaking in September, 
1983. (T 100-101) This lawsuit was initiated in October. 
At trial Appellant called Michael Bracken and Lemuel 
Leavitt as witnesses. Bracken testified that he had previously 
operated the block plant for the former owner, Veyo Concrete 
Products, and that he had been able to operate the plant on a 
continuous basis. (T 136-137) Bracken also testified that Veyo 
Concrete had been able to produce between 9,000 and 11,000 block 
per week with this plant. (T 138-139) Finally, Bracken testified 
that he found nothing unrealistic in Respondent Larkin's 
production projections. (T 139-140) 
Leavitt' s testimony provided no mofre support for 
Appellant's position than had Bracken's. Leavitt testified that 
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he had worked at the plant when it was owned and operated by Veyo 
Concrete. (T 145) 
After Appellant had abandoned his interest in the block 
plant, Leavitt and another individual had purchased the plant 
from Respondent Lava Products paying $3,000 more for the facility 
than Appellant had contracted to pay. (T 142, 146-147; 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 18 and Defendant's Exhibit No. 37) 
Leavitt testified that as late as September and October, 1986, he 
had produced as many as 7,000 blocks per week at the plant. (T 
143-145) He also testified that in his opinion a production 
projection of 40,000 blocks per month would not be unreasonable 
if the operator possessed sufficient capital. (T 146) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant's evidence failed to establish a prima facie 
case of fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation. Indeed 
Appellant's own evidence fails to establish that Respondents made 
any representation which could have reasonably been understood to 
be presently existing fact. Furthermore, if projections provided 
are so construed, Appellant's own evidence fails to establish 
that the representations were false. 
Even if the income projections were representations of 
fact and were false, there is no evidence indicating that 
Repondents knew or should have known that the projections were 
inaccurate or misleading. 
Finally, the evidence clearly establishes that 
Appellant could not have acted reasonably and in ignorance of the 
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falsity of the representations. His own evidence establishes 
that long before he executed the lease/purchase agreement, he had 
acquired a position equal with, if not superior to, Respondents— 
a position from which to thoroughly evaluate the condition and 
capacity of the block plant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO WEIGH 
THE EVIDENCE OR EVALUATE THE CREDIBILITY OF 
WITNESSES IN ORDER TO REACH ITS CONCLUSION. 
Respondents agree with the authorities cited in Point I 
of Appellant's brief. A review of the transcript (T 198-201) 
clearly indicates that it was not necessary for the trial court 
to weigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of any of the 
witnesses called by Appellant. Indeed the trial court was of the 
opinion that the evidence presented, viewed in the light most 
favorable to Appellant, did not establish a prima facie case of 
fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation. 
Even if this Court shall determine that the trial court 
improperly engaged in weighing the evidence br judging the 
credibility of witnesses, it is respectfully submitted that this 
conduct did not constitute prejudicial error since, as hereafter 
pointed out, there was no evidence adduced by Appellant 
concerning essential elements of his case, feee Cerritos Trucking 
Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, Utah, 645 P.2d 60& (1982). 
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POINT II 
APPELLANT FAILED TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE 
OF FRAUDULENT OR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION. 
The elements of fraudulent misrepresentation are set 
forth in the oft-cited case of Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 
P.2d 273 (1952). These elements include: 
(1) That a representation was made; 
(2) concerning a presently existing material fact; 
(3) which was false; 
(4) which the representor either 
(a) knew to be false, or 
(b) made recklessly, knowing that he had 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representations; 
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act 
upon it; 
(6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in 
ignorance of its falsity; 
(7) did in fact rely upon it; 
(8) and was thereby induced to act; 
(9) to his injury and damage. 
122 Utah at 144-145. 
Where a claim is made for negligent misrepresentation, 
there is a slight variation in the fourth element of the cause 
and one who is in a superior position to know material facts may 
be held liable if he carelessly or negligently misrepresents the 
facts, provided that the other elements of fraud are made out. 
Jardine v. Brunswick Corporation, 18 U.2d 378, 423 P.2d 659 
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(1967) (Note particularly footnote 2 and accompanying text at 
381). 
Whether the case is considered one of fraud or 
negligent misrepresentation, it is obvious that Appellant failed 
to establish that the income projections were made or intended as 
representations concerning "a presently existing material fact". 
In Hartford v. Drive-In Corporation/ 374 Mich. 192, 132 
N.W.2d 143 (1964), the Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed a 
chancellor's decision denying rescission upon allegations of 
fraud and misrepresentation where plaintiff claimed to have 
relied upon a sample operating statement projecting net earning 
based upon gross annual sales of $150,000, $175,000, and 
$200,000. 
The court was not convinced that the hypothesized 
income figures constituted representations of fact upon which 
plaintiff could have reasonably relied. We quote from the 
opinion: 
We have examined the written materials which 
plaintiff claims were false and upon which he 
claims to have relied. Assuming, but only 
arguendo, that they contained representations upon 
which plaintiff was entitled to rely, we cannot 
find in the proofs any evidence of their falsity. 
They consisted of three sample operating 
statements showing what net income could be 
expected, normal operating expenses considered, 
from assumed gross annual sales of $150,000, 
$175,000 and $200,000. There is nothing in the 
record to suggest that plaintiff's net income 
would have been less than that hypothesized had he 
in fact grossed $150,000. That he did not realize 
gross sales during his 10 months of operation at a 
rate which even approached $150,000 for the year, 
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could very well have been the result of 
plaintiff's own mismanagement, of which there was 
some evidence. 
132 N.W.2d at 144. 
Even if the projections in the instant case are viewed 
as statements of fact rather than estimates or opinion, the 
unrebutted testimony of Michael Bracken and Lemuel Leavitt 
establishes that the projections were not unrealistic in light of 
their experience both before and after the subject transaction. 
(T 139-140, 146) 
Furthermore, assuming that the projections were 
representations of fact and were false, it is apparent, in light 
of the testimony of the former operator and the current owner, 
that Appellant failed to present any evidence indicating that the 
Respondents knew or should have known that the projections were 
false or misleading. 
Perhaps the most obvious void in Appellant's case lies 
in the fact that if representations were made and if they were 
false, Appellant could in no way have acted reasonably and in 
ignorance of their falsity. Appellant, by his own account was in 
possession of the subject property for at least 73 days prior to 
the time he signed the lease/purchase agreement. (T 151-152) His 
access to the equipment and the former owners was not impaired in 
any way (T 153) and he was not only encouraged, but by his own 
account "directed", to talk to the previous owners concerning the 
production capabilities of the block plant. (T 153-154) He was 
also encouraged to talk to Gerald Strong who had completely 
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rebuilt the block plant (T 155) and he called Praschak and 
discussed the plant's operation with the original manufacturer. 
(T 154) 
One who complains of injury by reason of another's 
misrepresentation may not heedlessly accept as true that which 
his own experience calls into question. See Jardine v. Brunswick 
Corp., supra; Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Real-py, Utah, 641 P.2d 
124 (1982); Kohler v. Garden City, Utah, 639 P.2d 162 (1981). 
By March, 1982, Appellant was thoroughly familiar with 
the condition and capacity of the plant and Related equipment. (T 
166-167) He ultimately signed the lease/purchase agreement in 
December, 1982, and was contemplating exercising his option to 
purchase as late as July or August, 1983. (T 85, 181) 
The argument that Appellant acted Reasonably and in 
ignorance of the falsity of representations rtiade is in direct 
conflict with Appellant's own testimony. 
Finally, to the extent that Appellant seeks to 
establish a claim for negligent misrepresentation, the evidence 
clearly establishes that he, rather than the Respondents, was in 
the superior position to evaluate the condition of the block 
plant and related equipment and consequently his negligence was 
as great, if not greater, than any negligenc^ of which 
Respondents may have been guilty. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that appellant's evidence 
failed to establish a prima facie case of frauaulent or negligent 
9 
misrepresentation. Indeed Appellant's own evidence fails to 
establish that Respondents made any representation which could 
have reasonably been understood to be presently existing fact. 
Furthermore, if projections provided are so construed, 
Appellant's own evidence fails to establish that the represen-
tations were false. 
Even if the income projections were representations of 
fact and were false, there is no evidence indicating that 
Respondents knew or should have known that the projections were 
inaccurate or misleading. 
Finally the evidence clearly establishes that Appellant 
could not have acted reasonably and in ignorance of the falsity 
of the representations. His own evidence establishes that long 
before he executed the lease/purchase agreement, he had acquired 
a position equal with, if not superior to, Respondents—a 
position from which to thoroughly evaluate the condition and 
capacity of the block plant. 
The Judgment of Dismissal should be affirmed and 
Respondents should recover their costs on this appeal, and 
should, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 33, Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals, recover attorney's fees reasonably incurred in 
the defense of this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of November, 1987. 
Gary W. Pendleton 
Attorney for Respondents 
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